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Axiomaticbargainingtheory(e.g.,Nash’stheorem)isstatic. Weattempttoprovide
a dynamic justiﬁcation for the theory. Suppose a judge or arbitrator must allocate
utility in an (inﬁnite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the judge
is presented with a utility possibility set in R2
+. H e / s h em u s tc h o o s ea na l l o c a -
tion in the set, constrained only by Nash’s axioms, in the sense that a penalty is
paid if and only if a utility allocation is chosen at date T that is inconsistent, ac-
cording to one of the axioms, with a utility allocation chosen at some earlier date.
Penalties are discounted with t and the judge chooses any allocation, at a given
date, that minimizes the penalty he/she pays at that date. Under what conditions
will the judge’s chosen allocations converge to the Nash allocation over time? We
answer this question for three canonical axiomatic bargaining solutions—Nash,
Kalai–Smorodinsky,and“egalitarian”—andgeneralizetheanalysistoabroadclass
of axiomatic models.
Keywords. Axiomatic bargaining theory, judicial precedent, dynamic founda-
tions, Nash’s bargaining solution.
JEL classification. C70, C78, K4.
1. Introduction
Axiomatic bargaining theory is timeless. In Nash’s (1950) original conception, the appa-
ratus is meant to model a bargaining problem between two individuals, each of whom
initially possesses an endowment of objects, and von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM)
preferences over lotteries on the allocation of these objects to the two individuals. An
impasse point is deﬁned as the pair of utilities each receives if no trade takes place, that
is, if no bargain is reached (here, particular vNM utility functions are employed). Nash
quicklypassestoaformulationoftheprobleminutilityspace, whereabargainingprob-
lem becomes a convex, compact, comprehensive utility possibilities set, containing the
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impasse point. He then imposes the axioms of Pareto efﬁciency, symmetry, indepen-
dence, and scale invariance, and proves that the only “solution” that satisﬁes these ax-
ioms on an unrestricted domain of problems is the Nash solution—for any problem, the
utility point that maximizes the product of the individual gains from the threat point.1
We say the theory is timeless, because of the independence axiom, for this axiom
requires consistency in bargaining behavior between pairs of problems. What kind of
experience might lead the bargainers to respect the independence axiom? Presumably,
if they bargained for a sufﬁciently long period of time, facing many different problems,
they might come across a pair of problems that are related as the premise of the inde-
pendence axiom requires: problem S is contained in problem Q (as utility possibilities
sets), the bargainers faced problem Q last year and chose allocation q ∈ Q, and it so
happens that q ∈ S. It is certainly reasonable, they reason, to agree upon q when facing
S this year, because of something like Le Chatelier’s principle. (“If we chose q when all
those allocations in Q \ S were available, we effectively had decided to restrict our bar-
gaining to S last year anyway, so let’s choose q ∈ S again now.”) But if this is the way
that bargainers might “learn” how independence bears on decisions, then Nash’s the-
ory seems quite unrealistic. For with an unrestricted domain of problems, how often
will bargainers face two problems that are related as the premise of the independence
axiom requires? Almost never.
Notice that the same argument of timelessness does not apply to the scale invari-
ance axiom, even though that axiom compares the behavior of the solution on pairs
of problems, because that axiom is meant to model the idea that only von Neumann–
Morgenstern preferences count, not their particular representation as utility functions.
While the independence axiom can be viewed as a behavioral axiom, the scale invari-
ance axiom is an informational axiom.
The other axioms—symmetry and Pareto—are also behavioral but not timeless in
our sense. It is not a mystery why bargainers should learn to cooperate (Pareto) or that
two bargainers with the same preferences (and the same strengths) and the same en-
dowments should end up ata symmetric allocation. Thus, thecritique weareproposing
of Nash bargaining theory is that one of the behavioral axioms (independence) has no
apparent justiﬁcation via some kind of learning through history, in the presence of an-
other axiom (unrestricted domain), which essentially precludes that learning could ever
take place.
Our goal in this article is to replace the timelessness of axiomatic bargaining theory
with a dynamic approach in which decision makers learn from history. Indeed, there
is, we think, an obvious judicial practice, which provides a way to render the theory
dynamic. Suppose a judge or a court or an arbitrator faces a number of cases over time.
Thereisaconstitutionthatprescribes whatthejudicial decisionmustbein certainclear
and polar cases. But most cases do not ﬁt the speciﬁcations of these constitutionally
1Axiomatic bargaining theory has two major applications: one to bargaining and the other to distribu-
tive justice. Of course, Nash (1950) pioneered the ﬁrst interpretation, and the second was pioneered by
Thomson and Lensberg (1989), who showed that many of the classical bargaining solutions (Nash, Kalai–
Smorodinsky, egalitarian)couldbecharacterizedbysetsofaxiomswithethicalinterpretations. SeeRoemer
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described cases, so judges rely on judicial precedent or case law: they look for a case in
the past that is similar in important respects, or related, to the one at hand and decide
the present case in like manner. Thus judicial precedent is a procedure that provides
a link to the past that is similar to the links between problems that the independence
axiom—and, indeed, from a formal viewpoint, the scale invariance axiom—impose.
Of course, there is a possibility that the case being considered at present time, i,h a s
two precedent cases j and k, each of which is related to i in some important way, but
which were decideddifferently. In general, the judge cannot decide the present case in a
way to satisfy both precedents, and we will represent this conﬂict in our formal model.2
Imagine, then, that there is a domain of “cases” D, which is some set of Nash-type
bargaining problems (convex, compact, comprehensive sets in R2
+). Suppose that the
domainisrichenoughthattherearepairsofcasesthatarerelatedbythescaleinvariance
axiom, and pairs of cases that are related by the independence axiom; there are also
some symmetrical cases in D. At each date t = 1 2 3    , a case is drawn randomly by
Nature, according to some probability distribution on D. This inﬁnite sequence of cases
is called a history. The judge must decide each case sequentially (here, how to choose a
feasible utility allocation) and he is restricted to obey the Nash axioms. What does this
mean? If the case is symmetric, he must choose a symmetric point in the case or pay a
penalty of 1; for every case, he must choose a Pareto efﬁcient point or pay a penalty of 1.
If a case is related to a prior case in the history by the scale invariance or independence
axiom, and he does not choose the allocation in the present case that is consistent with
his prior choice according to the salient axiom, he must pay a penalty of δt if the prior
case appeared t periods ago, where 0 <δ<1 is a given discount factor. (Thus, paying a
penalty of 1 if a Pareto efﬁcient point is not chosen in the case at hand is just a special
case of this rule, because δ0 = 1.) If a case comes up that is not symmetric and is not
related to any prior case by scale invariance or independence, he can choose any Pareto
efﬁcient point with zero penalty. At each date, the judge must choose an allocation that
minimizes his penalty. In general, at a given date, he may end up paying penalties with
respect to a number of cases in the past that are precedents, and so his penalty would
be a sum of the form

i∈P δt for some set of nonnegative integers P.
Now suppose thatwe consider adomain D where Nash’s theoremis true: that is, any
solution ϕ:D → R2
+ that satisﬁes ϕ(i) ∈ i for all i ∈ D that satisﬁes the Nash axioms on
D is, in fact, the Nash solution on D, denoted N. Call such a domain a Nash domain.
(The simplest Nash domain consists of precisely one symmetric set. Any solution on
this domain must obey the symmetry and Pareto axioms. Thus any solution obeying the
axioms coincides with N on this domain.) Our question is this: When is it the case that
a judge who plays by the above rules and faces an inﬁnite history of cases, will converge
over time almost surely to prescribing the Nash solution to the cases he faces?
To be precise, consider a superdomain HD of all possible histories over a given Nash
domain, D, endowed with the product probability measure induced on histories by the
2Real judges tend to decide which precedent ﬁts the case at hand more closely and arguments revolve
around the proximity of various precedents to the case at hand, but we will not follow this tack.292 Fleurbaey and Roemer Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
given probability measure on D. When would the judge almost surely converge to pre-
scribingtheNashsolutionastimepassesonhistoriesin HD? Weprove,undersomesim-
ple additional assumptions, that convergence to the Nash solution occurs almost surely
foreverysetofhistories HD,wher eDisaﬁniteNashdomainthatsatisﬁesaspeciﬁccon-
dition if and only if 0 <δ≤ 1
3, that is, if and only if history is discounted at a sufﬁciently
high rate. (Recall that the discount factor δ and the discount rate r are related by the
formula δ = 1/(1+r).) This is our dynamic justiﬁcation of Nash’s theorem. However, we
also show that there are Nash domains for which convergence to the Nash solution does
not occur almost surely. In that sense, we can say that the Nash characterization theo-
rem is dynamically imperfect. In contrast, we show that Kalai and Smorodinsky’s (1975)
characterization of their alternative solution, as well as Kalai’s (1977) characterization
of the egalitarian solution, are dynamically perfect in the sense that for every ﬁnite do-
main on which the theorem is true, almost sure convergence to the solution is obtained
for appropriate values of δ.
We extend the results to more general penalty systems and to a general class of ax-
iomatic theorems. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the axiomatic framework. Sections 3 and 4 successively deal with the Nash solution,
the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, and the egalitarian solution. Section 5 shows how such
results can be generalized and applied to any characterization theorem in a general ax-
iomatic framework. Section 6 considers the possibility for the judge to make decisions
not only on the basis of penalties currently incurred, but also on the basis of future pos-
sible penalties. Section 7 concludes.
2. Framework and axioms
A domain D ={ i j k    } contains problems, namely, subsets of R2
+ that are compact,
convex, and comprehensive.3 We restrict attention throughout the paper to ﬁnite do-
mains.Forsimplicity,wealsorestrictattentiontosetsthathaveanonemptyintersection
with R2
++.L e t∂i denote the upper frontier of i, i.e.,4
∂i ={ x ∈ i |  y ∈ i y   x} 
and let ∂∗i denote the subset of Pareto efﬁcient points of i:
∂∗i ={ x ∈ i |  y ∈ i y > x} 
Let I(i)denote the vector of ideal points, i.e.,
I(i)=

max{x1 ∈ R+ |∃ x2 (x1 x2) ∈ i} max{x2 ∈ R+ |∃ x1 (x1 x2) ∈ i}

 
For any α ∈ R2
++,as e tj is an α-rescaling of i if
j ={ x ∈ R2
+ |∃ y ∈ i x1 = α1y1 x2 = α2y2} 
3As e ti is comprehensive when for all x ∈ i and all y ≤ x,o n eh a sy ∈ i.
4Vector inequalities are denoted ≥, >, and  .Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale 293
A solution ϕ:D → R2
+ is a mapping such that for all i ∈ D, ϕ(i) ∈ i. The following
axiomsappearinthelandmarktheoremsbyNash (1950),KalaiandSmorodinsky(1975),
and Kalai (1977).
Weak Pareto (WP). Foralli ∈ D, ϕ(i) ∈ ∂i.
Symmetry(Sym). For all i ∈ D,i fi is symmetric, then ϕ1(i) = ϕ2(i).
Scale Invariance (ScInv). For all i j ∈ D,i fj is an α-rescaling of i for some α ∈ R2
++,
then
ϕ(j) = (α1ϕ1(i) α2ϕ2(i)) 
Nash Independence (Ind). For all i j ∈ D,i fi ⊆ j and ϕ(j) ∈ i,t h e nϕ(i) = ϕ(j).
Monotonicity(Mon). For all i j ∈ D,i fi ⊆ j,t h e nϕ(i) ≤ ϕ(j).
Individual Monotonicity (IMon). For all i j ∈ D and p ∈{ 1 2},i fi ⊆ j and
Ip(i) = Ip(j),t h e nϕ3−p(i) ≤ ϕ3−p(j).
Consider a domain D and an inﬁnite number of periods t = 1 2    .Ahistory H is a
sequence of problems and chosen points
H = ((i1 x1) (i2 x2)    )
such that at every period t, xt ∈ it.A t e a c h t, a random process picks it ∈ D.F o r a n y
given i ∈ D, the probability that it = i may depend on the previous part of the history
((i1 x1)     (it−1 xt−1)). We assume throughout the paper that the random process is
regular in the sense that it never ascribes a zero probability (or a probability converging
tozero)toanygivenproblem, i.e., ifforevery i ∈ D,ther eexistsπi > 0 suchthatforevery
t ∈ N and for every past history ((i1 x1)     (it−1 xt−1))  the probability that it = i is at
least πi.
Ateachperiod t,thejudgechoosesxt ∈ it. Hisobjectiveateachperiodistominimize
the penalty for this period, which is the sum of penalties incurred for a violation of each
axiom. Each violation of an axiom implies a penalty of 1 unit. However, the penalty
for violating an axiom involving a reference to past problems is discounted by a factor
δ ∈ (0 1): the farther back in the past the reference problem is, the lower is the penalty.
Let r denote the corresponding discount rate: δ = 1/(1+r).
To avoid any ambiguity, it is useful to specify what a violation of an axiom is exactly.
Choosing xt ∈ it may entail the following penalties.
• WP: Penalty of 1 if xt / ∈ ∂it.
• Sym: Penalty of 1 if it is symmetric and ϕ1(it)  = ϕ2(it).
• ScInv: Penaltyofδs ifit isanα-rescalingofit−s andϕ(it)  = (α1ϕ1(it−s) α2ϕ2(it−s)).294 Fleurbaey and Roemer Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
• Ind: Penalty of δs if ϕ(it)  = ϕ(it−s) and either [it ⊆ it−s ϕ(it−s) ∈ it] or
[it−s ⊆ it ϕ(it) ∈ it−s].
• IMon: Penalty of δs if for some p ∈{ 1 2},e i t h e rit+1 ⊆ it, Ip(it+1) = Ip(it),a n d
ϕ3−p(it+1)   ϕ3−p(it) or it ⊆ it+1, Ip(it+1) = Ip(it),a n dϕ3−p(it)   ϕ3−p(it+1).
• Mon: Penalty of δs if either it ⊆ it−s and ϕ(it)   ϕ(it−s) or it−s ⊆ it and
ϕ(it−s)   ϕ(it).
One restriction of this system of penalties is that the violation of any axiom that in-
volves the past always counts less than the violation of any axiom that does not refer to
the past. We examine more general systems of penalties in Section 5.
Given a domain D and a random process to select problems, we say that the judge
converges almost surely to the solution ϕ if with probability 1 there is a date T such that
for all t ≥ T, the judge chooses ϕ(it).
3. Nash
The Nash solution, denoted N,i sd e ﬁ n e db y
N(i)={ x ∈ i |∀ y ∈ i x1x2 ≥ y1y2} 
The domain D is called a Nash domain if Nash’s theorem holds on D, i.e., if N(·) is the
only solution that satisﬁes WP , Sym, ScInv, and Ind on D.
We are interested in domains that satisfy the following condition.
Condition CN.F o r a l l i ∈ D, there exists a sequence j1     jn ∈ D such that j1 = i, jn is
symmetric, and for all t = 1     n−1,e i t h e r
(i) jt ⊆ jt+1 and N(jt+1) ∈ jt or
(ii) ∃α ∈ R2
++, jt+1 is an α-rescaling of jt.
Call such a sequence a special chain beginning at i.
Proposition 1. Domain D is a Nash domain if it satisﬁes Condition CN. The converse
is not true.
Proof. If: Let ϕ be any solution on D that satisﬁes Nash’s axioms. Let i ∈ D.B yCondi-
tion CN, there is a special chain j1     jn beginning at i.B yS y ma n dW P ,ϕ(jn) = N(jn).
One can now rollback along the special chain to i, and at each step, ϕ(jk) = N(jk) either
by Ind (case (i)) or by ScInv (case (ii)). For k = 1,w eh a v eϕ(i) = N(i). It follows that
ϕ = N on D.
Converse: Let D ={ i j k l m} for
i = co{(0 0) (3 0) (2 2) (0 4)}
j = co{(0 0) (3 0) (2 2) (0 3)}Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale 295
k = co{(0 0) (2 0) (2 2) (0 4)}
l = co{(0 0) (4 0) (4 4) (0 8)}
m = co{(0 0) (8 0) (0 8)} 
By WP and Sym, ϕ(j) = N(j)= (2 2) and ϕ(m) = N(m)= (4 4).B y I n d ,d u e t ol ⊆ m,
ϕ(l) = N(l)= (4 4).B yS c I n v ,a sk is a rescaling of l, ϕ(k) = N(k)= (2 2).
Now consider i. There is no special chain that begins at i. It is not symmetric, it is
not the rescaling of another set, and it is not included in another set for which the Nash
point is in i.
Yet one must have ϕ(i) = N(i)= (2 2).B y W P ,ϕ(i) must belong either to the seg-
ment (3 0)(2 2) or to the segment (2 2)(0 4). Suppose one took ϕ(i) from a point
x of the segment (3 0)(2 2) different from (2 2).T h e n , a s j ⊆ i,b yI n do n es h o u l d
have ϕ(j) = x, a contradiction. Suppose one took ϕ(i) from a point y of the segment
(2 2)(0 4) different from (2 2).T h e n ,a sk ⊆ i,b yI n do n es h o u l dh a v eϕ(k) = y,ac o n -
tradiction. Therefore, Nash’s theorem holds on D even though Condition CN does not
hold. 
We can now study the convergence of the judge’s decisions toward the Nash solu-
tion. The following proposition states that with probability 1 the judge’s decisions will
exactly coincide with the Nash solution within a ﬁnite number of periods. The argu-
ment is that when Condition CN holds for D, with probability 1, there will be some ﬁnite
time at which all the elements of D appear in a row, each preceded by the special chain
beginning at it, in reverse order: jn jn−1     j2 i. When encountering jn, the judge will
chooseN(jn)toavoidthepenaltiesforviolationofWPandSym,andthiswillinducehim
tochoosetheNashpointinthesubsequentproblemstoavoidthepenaltiesforviolation
of Ind or ScInv. This happens, however, only if earlier possible “mistakes,” and the re-
latedpenalties, are not overwhelming. Therefore, this requires the past to be sufﬁciently
discounted. When the past is strongly discounted, however, one may fear that once this
particular sequence is past, the judge may err again when confronted with an arbitrary
followingsequenceofproblems. Weprove,however,thattheparticularsequenceofspe-
cial chains is powerful enough to impose the Nash solution on all subsequent problems.
Theorem 1. The judge converges almost surely to the Nash solution on every domain
satisfying Condition CN if and only if δ ≤ 1
3.
Proof. If: Let D be a domain satisfying Condition CN. Recall that by assumption, D is
ﬁnite and the random process is regular.
Step 1. Enumerate the problems in D as 1 2     M. For each problem i,d e ﬁ n et h e
special chain beginning at i as i j2(i)     jn(i)(i). Consider the sequence of problems
jn(1)(1) jn(1)−1(1)     1 jn(2)(2)     2 jn(3)(3)     3     jn(M)(M)     M 
At every period, the probability that this sequence will occur at the next period is, by the
assumption that the random process is regular, at least
πjn(1)(1)πjn(1)−1(1)···π1πjn(2)(2)···π2···πjn(M)(M)···πM > 0 296 Fleurbaey and Roemer Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Therefore, with probability 1, this sequence occurs at a ﬁnite date T.
If N(jn(1)(1)) is not chosen, the penalty is at least 1, since either WP or Sym is vio-
lated. If, however, N(jn(1)(1)) is chosen, this entails at most two violations with respect
to all previous choices—namely, for any previous date, a violation of ScInv and/or Ind.













Since δ ≤ 1





so the judge will choose N(jn(1)(1)). Indeed, this argument shows that any symmetric
problem will be assigned the Nash point by the judge when it occurs.
Step 2. Now consider a later element jn(1)−k in the sequence, for k = 1     n(1) − 1.
If the judge does not choose N(jn(1)−k(1)), he violates either ScInv or Ind with respect
















≤ δk ≤ δ 
the judge chooses N(jn(1)−k(1)). In this way, we see that we have the Nash choice on the
whole sequence.
Step 3. Now let the element that occurs after this sequence be i. If the judge does
not choose N(i), he violates two axioms with respect to the previous occurrence of i in
the sequence—namely, ScInv and Ind. The penalty is, therefore, at least 2δt for some
1 ≤ t ≤
M
j=2n(j)+1. (The lowest penalty is when i = 1.) Let Q =
M
j=2n(j)+1.A l t e r n a -
tively, if he chooses N(i), he at most violates ScInv and Ind with respect to all problems
preceding the sequence (from the beginning of the history until Q + 1 periods before)













This is equivalent to δ ≤ 1
2, which holds true.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale 297
Step 4. AssumethatthejudgehaschosentheNashpointforS periodsaftertheendof
the sequence (in the previous step we showed this to be true for S = 1). Let the element
that occurs at S + 1 be i. If the judge does not choose N(i),h ev i o l a t e sa tl e a s tS c I n v
and Ind with respect to the previous occurrence of i in the sequence, and the penalty is,
therefore, at least 2δt for some S + 1 ≤ t ≤ S + Q. If he chooses N(i),h ea tm o s tv i o l a t e s
ScInv and Ind with respect to all problems preceding the sequence (from the beginning













which is equivalent to δ ≤ 1
2.
By induction he chooses Nash henceforth.
Only if: Suppose 1
3 <δ<1.L e tD ={ i j}, as described in Figure 1. The problem j is
symmetric.
The fact that δ>1



















There is a positive probability (at least πT
i ) that history starts with T occurrences of i.
Suppose the judge picks point x in i for t = 1     T.
Figure 1. Example: the domain D ={ i j}.298 Fleurbaey and Roemer Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)




Sym and the penalty is 1. If he chooses another point, the penalty is 1 + 2
T
t=1δt.T h i s


















which is true by assumption. Therefore, the judge picks x.
Consider a period S>T+ 1 and assume that x has been chosen at all times before
( w ek n o wt h i st ob et r u ef o rS = T +2). If i occurs, x is picked again without any penalty,
while any other point costs a penalty. If j occurs, picking x costs 1, while picking N(j)
costs 2
S−1
t=1 δt > 2
T
t=1δt. So, again x is chosen.
By induction, at no period in the future can the Nash point be chosen. 
Note that the result holds only if, as assumed in this paper, δ>0.W h e nδ = 0 the
judge is tied only by WP and Sym, and this is clearly insufﬁcient to make him converge
to the Nash solution.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 remains true if we assume that the judge takes his ofﬁce at a
certain point in time, after an arbitrary history has unfolded, and feels bound by the
previousdecisionsandtheattachedpenalties. NomatterhowfarfromtheNashsolution
the antecedent decisions have been, he will converge almost surely to the Nash solution
under the conditions of the theorem.
Remark2. Theseresultsdependonthejudgebeingmyopic. Forinstance,inthesecond
part of the proof of Theorem 1, the judge could anticipate that j will occur at some date
and that the only way not to incur any penalty is to take N(i)right from the beginning.
More on this issue will be said in Section 6.
The main limitation of Theorem 1 is that it applies only to domains for which Con-
dition CN holds. By Proposition 1, this is a strict subset of the set of Nash domains. It is
easy to weaken Condition CN in such a way that Theorem 1 remains valid over the cor-
responding larger set of domains, but the next proposition shows that Theorem 1 does
not generalize to the full set of all Nash domains. Moreover, this problem is indepen-
dent of the particular system of penalties adopted. (This result does not even require
the random process to be regular.)
Proposition 2. There exist Nash domains such that, whatever δ, whatever the value of
the penalty attached to each axiom, and whatever the random process, convergence to N
does not occur almost surely on such domains.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale 299
The proof involves a tedious example with a 10-problem domain and is available as
a supplementary ﬁle on the journal website.5 This negative result is due to the partic-
ular way in which Ind may work in the characterization of the Nash solution for some
domains. Observe that in the example given in the proof of Proposition 1,o n em u s t
have ϕ(i) = N(i)because j k ⊆ i and the constraints known about ϕ(j) and ϕ(k) force
ϕ(i) to belong to two different segments of ∂i, the intersection of which is {N(i)}.T h i s
is the static form of the axiomatic analysis. In the dynamic setting in which the judge
operates, this kind of constraint may be too weak to force him to choose N(i).6 This
does not happen in this particular example because the constraints on ϕ(j) and ϕ(k)
are ϕ(j) = ϕ(k) = N(i), so that, given the shape of these sets, a violation of Ind in j or k
would occur if the judge chose any non-Nash point in i. The proof, therefore, requires a
more complicated example in which the constraints on the smaller sets are less precise
so that the judge may pick points other than the Nash point in these sets and then also
pick non-Nash points in the large set.
One can see from the example that proves Proposition 2 that the failure of conver-
gence is not a convergence to another solution, but an oscillation between several so-
lutions. One may then wonder if a stronger form of failure can occur, namely, conver-
gence to another solution. The answer is, fortunately for the Nash approach, negative.
(We assume again that the random process is regular.)
Proposition 3. If δ ≤ 1
3 and convergence to a particular solution ϕ occurs with positive
probability in a Nash domain, then ϕ = N.
Proof.L e t DbeaNashdomainandassumethatconvergencetoaparticularsolutionϕ
occurs with positive probability. This means that there is a set H of histories, occurring
with positive probability, such that for every history h ∈ H, there is a ﬁnite Th such that
for all t ≥ Th, ϕ(it) is chosen in every it.
Deﬁne the subset of H:
H0 ={ h ∈ H |∃ i j ∈ D the sequence (i j) occurs only a ﬁnite number of times in h} 
Subset H0 is a set of histories of measure zero because the process is regular. Thus, the
setofhistories H  = H\H0 isnotempty(ithasthesamemassasH)andforeveryh ∈ H ,
for every i j ∈ D, the sequence (i j) occurs an inﬁnite number of times. A fortiori, note
that every i also occurs an inﬁnite number of times.
We now prove that ϕ obeys all the Nash axioms on D; since D is a Nash domain, it
must be that ϕ = N.
First, ϕ must satisfy Sym, because δ ≤ 1
3 and, therefore, as shown in the proof of
Theorem 1, the judge always selects the Nash point (which is symmetric) in symmetric
sets.
Second, suppose ϕ does not satisfy WP . Let h ∈ H  and let date t b et h eﬁ r s td a t ei nh
at which ϕ(it)/ ∈ ∂it. By the argument of the previous paragraph, it is not symmetric. If
5http://econtheory.org/supp/588/supplement.pdf.
6When Ind imposes a penalty on the judge only when the past set is the larger set, this constraint simply
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the judge selects ϕ(it), the penalty is at least 1 (for a violation of WP). If the judge selects
apointin ∂it, hedoesnotviolateWPorSym, butmayatworstviolateScInvandIndwith
respect to all t −1 periods, so that the penalty is less than






As h ∈ H , it occurs an inﬁnite number of times, which contradicts the assumption that
convergence to ϕ occurs in every h ∈ H .
Third,supposethat ϕ violatesScInvwithrespecttoaparticularpair (i j).L e th ∈ H .
As ϕ selects the Nash point in symmetric sets, and i and j occur inﬁnitely many times
in h, i and j arenotsymmetricifconvergenceto ϕ isobtainedin h.M o r e o v e r ,h contains
inﬁnitely many occurrences of (i j). When such a sequence occurs, the fact that the
combination of ϕ(i) and ϕ(j) violates ScInv implies that choosing ϕ(j) costs at least δ.
Choosing a point x ∈ ∂j \ϕ(j) costs less than




whichislessthan δ as δ ≤ 1
3. Therefore,itisimpossibleforthejudgetochoose ϕ(j) from
j when (i j) occurs. Convergence to ϕ cannot occur in h, a contradiction.
Fourth, ϕ must satisfy Ind. Suppose that it violates it with respect to a particular
pair (i j).A sϕ selects the Nash point in symmetric sets, necessarily one of them is not
symmetric, say j. One can then repeat the rest of the argument developed for ScInv and
derive a contradiction. 
4. Other solutions
We now examine how similar results can be obtained for the other two classical solu-
tions of bargaining theory, the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution and the egalitarian solution.
They reveal interesting differences with the Nash solution. One difference is that special
chains can now be found that exactly delineate the domains for which the characteriza-
tion theorems hold true. Another difference is that the theorem that characterizes the
egalitarian solution has a smaller number of axioms.
4.1 Kalai–Smorodinsky
The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution is denoted KS. One has
KS(i) ={ x ∈ ∂i | x1/x2 = I1(i)/I2(i)} 
Ad o m a i nD is called a Kalai–Smorodinsky domain if the Kalai–Smorodinsky theorem
holds on D, i.e., if KS(·) is the only solution satisfying WP , Sym, ScInv, and IMon on D.
Condition CKS.F o r a l li ∈ D, there exists a sequence j1     jn such that j1 = i, jn is
symmetric and for all t = 1     n−1,e i t h e rTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale 301
(i) jt ⊆ jt+1 (or jt ⊇ jt+1), I(jt) = I(jt+1),a n dK S (jt+1) ∈ ∂jt or
(ii) ∃α ∈ R2
++, jt+1 is an α-rescaling of jt.
Again, and without risk of confusion with the previous section, let us call such a
sequence a special chain beginning at i.
Proposition 4. A domain D is a Kalai–Smorodinsky domain if and only if it satisﬁes
Condition CKS.
The proof of this proposition is tedious and is available as a supplementary ﬁle on
the journal website.7 This result makes it possible to obtain the following theorem.
Theorem2. ThejudgeconvergestoKSalmostsurelyonallKalai–Smorodinskydomains
if and only if δ ≤ 1
3.
The proof closely mimics the proof of Theorem 1, with IMon replacing Ind.
4.2 Egalitarian solution
The egalitarian solution is denoted E.O n eh a s
E(i)={ x ∈ ∂i | x1 = x2} 
Ad o m a i nD will be called an E domain if the egalitarian solution is the only solution
satisfying WP , Sym, and Mon on D. This egalitarian theorem is a variant of Theorem 1 in
Kalai (1977)and canbefound in Thomsonand Lensberg (1989, Theorem2.5)andPeters
(1992, Theorem 4.31).
Condition CE.F o ra l li ∈ D, there exists a sequence j1     jn such that j1 = i, jn is
symmetric and for all t = 1     n−1, E(jt) = E(jt+1) and either jt ⊆ jt+1 or jt+1 ⊆ jt.
Again the sequence j1     jn will be called a special chain beginning at i.
Proposition 5. A domain D is an E domain if and only if it satisﬁes Condition CE.
Proof. If: Let ϕ be any solution on D satisfying the axioms of the egalitarian theorem.
Let i ∈ D.B y Condition CE there is a special chain j1     jn beginning at i.B y S y m ,
E(jn) ischosenfrom jn and onerollsbackalongthespecial chainbyapplying Mon. This
implies ϕ(i) = E(i).
Only if: Let D+ bethesubsetof D containing theproblems i with aspecialchain. We
must show that D+ = D if the egalitarian theorem holds on D. Suppose that there exists
a problem k ∈ D\D+.L e t
Z ={ x ∈ R2
+ |∃ i ∈ D+ x= E(i)} 
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Construct a monotone path P from zero for which the intersection with the 45◦ line
coincideswith Z on R2
++.M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,P is thegraph ofanincreasing function f such
that f(0) = 0 and
{x ∈ P | x1 = x2}=Z ∪{0} 
Let ϕ bedeﬁnedby, forall i ∈ D, {ϕ(i)}=P ∩∂i.B yc o n s t r u c t i o nϕ satisﬁes WP and Mon.
It satisﬁes Sym because all symmetric problems are in D+ and ϕ coincides with E on
D+.B u tϕ  = E unless D = D+, which proves the “only if” part of the proposition. 
The next theorem displays a more favorable threshold for δ thanks to the presence,
in the egalitarian theorem, of fewer axioms that involve a reference to past decisions.
Theorem 3. Thejudge convergesto E almostsurelyonallEdomainsifandonlyif δ ≤ 1
2.
The “if” part is a corollary of Theorem 4. The converse is an immediate adaptation
of the second part of the proof of Theorem 1.
5. Generalization
The similarity between the results of the previous sections suggests an underlying com-
mon structure. In this section, we provide a general result that covers more theorems
and other frameworks than the bargaining model. Consider an abstract setting in which
a problem is a subset i of a general set O of options and a solution ϕ,d e ﬁ n e do nad o -
main D, has to pick an element of this set: ϕ(i) ∈ i.
Theaxiomsofacharacterizationtheoremhavetwogeneralformsandarelabelled1k
for k = 1     K1 and 2k for k = 1     K2, respectively. The ﬁrst type of axiom, “unary”
axioms, requires the solution to be chosen from a speciﬁc subset of i whenever i is of
a particular sort. Let Dk
1 be a subset of the domain D and let Gk
1 be a correspondence
from D to 2O such that for all i ∈ D, Gk
1(i) ⊆ i.
Axiom 1k. For all i ∈ D,i fi ∈ Dk
1,t h e nϕ(i) ∈ Gk
1(i).
The second type of axiom, “binary” axioms, requires the points chosen by the solu-
tion for two sets i, j to stand in a particular relation whenever these two sets are them-
selves related in a speciﬁc way. Let Dk
2 be a subset of D2 that contains the pair (i i) for
all i ∈ D and let Gk
2 be a correspondence from D2 to 2O×O such that for all (i j) ∈ D2,
Gk
2(i j) ⊆ i × j. Moreover, we impose that for all i ∈ D, Gk
2(i i) contains no (x y) such
that x  = y.
Axiom 2k. For all (i j) ∈ D2,i f(i j) ∈ Dk
2,t h e n(ϕ(i) ϕ(j)) ∈ Gk
2(i j).





1 is the subset of symmetric problems and Gk
1(i) is the intersection of i
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The other axioms are of the second kind. For Scale Invariance, Dk
2 is the subset of
pairs such that one set is a rescaling of the other, and Gk
2(i j) is the set of pairs in i × j
such that one point is the rescaling of the other in the same proportion as for the sets
i, j.F o rN a s hI n d e p e n d e n c e ,Dk
2 is the subset of pairs (i j) such that i ⊆ j,a n dGk
2(i j) is
the set of pairs (x y) ∈ i ×j such that if y ∈ i,t h e nx = y:
Gk
2(i j) ={ (x y) ∈ i ×j | x = y or y/ ∈ i} 
For Monotonicity, Dk
2 is also the subset of pairs (i j) such that i ⊆ j,a n dGk
2(i j) is the
set of pairs (x y) ∈ i ×j such that x ≤ y,a n ds oo n .
The binary axioms used in the previous sections all satisfy the restriction that for all
i ∈ D, Gk
2(i i) contains no (x y) such that x  = y. This restriction is not needed in static
axiomatics because by deﬁnition, ϕ(i) is only one element of i. But in the sequential
frameworkofthejudge,itispossibleforhimtochoosedifferentelementsofiatdifferent
occurrences of i. It is then important that binary axioms give him incentives to choose
consistently.
One could imagine other types of axioms, involving a greater number of problems,
such as
ϕ(i) = ϕ(j)  ⇒ ϕ(i ∪j)= ϕ(i) 
Thiswouldrequiredeﬁningasystemofpenaltieswhenthejudgeviolatessuchanaxiom
that involves two problems treated at two different periods in the past. This extension is
left for future research.
Let D be given, with a set of K1 unary axioms and K2 binary axioms. A special chain
for a solution ϕ beginning at i in D is a sequence of problems j1     jn ∈ D such that
j1 = i and






















What these conditions say is simple: for any solution ϕ  that satisﬁes all the axioms,
ϕ (jn) = ϕ(jn) is imposed by the unary axioms, while for all pairs (jt jt+1), ϕ (jt) = ϕ(jt)
is imposed by the binary axioms if ϕ (jt+1) = ϕ(jt+1). One then sees that by rolling back
the sequence from jn to j1, ϕ (i) = ϕ(i) is imposed by the combination of all the axioms.
Note that in condition (ii) one could incorporate constraints on ϕ (jt) imposed
by unary axioms in conjunction with binary axioms. One could also consider
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Such possibilities were actually used in the special chains deﬁned in the previous sec-
tions. We ignore them here because it does not alter the results obtained in this section,
but it does complicate the presentation.
Bythe“rollingback”argument,wehaveobtainedtheﬁrstpartofthefollowingresult.
Proposition 6. As o l u t i o nϕ is the only one that satisﬁes all the K1 + K2 axioms on a
ﬁnite domain D if for all i ∈ D, there is a special chain for ϕ beginning at i. The converse
does not hold in general.
We do not need to prove the second part of this statement because from Propo-
sition 1 we already know that the converse is not true in general. Indeed, in general
there are many other ways to force a precise value of ϕ(i) than by a special chain be-
ginning at i, and it is somewhat surprising that we could obtain the converse for the
Kalai–Smorodinsky and the egalitarian solutions.
Let us assume that the minimal (undiscounted) penalty for the violation of any ax-
iominthejudge’scourtis a andthatforabinaryaxiom, theaveragepenaltyis b.T h ek e y
number in the following theorem is the ratio of penalties K2b/a, which is a lower bound
for the “interest rate” with which the judge discounts the past. The critical interest rate
never increases when a penalty that involves a unary axiom increases. Indeed, a greater
weight for these axioms reinforces the right choice when a set jn occurs and never en-
courages the judge to preserve past “mistakes.” The role of the binary axioms and their
penalties is more subtle. The critical interest rate increases with a penalty for a binary
axiom if it is greater than another penalty, because this raises b without altering a,b u t
r decreases if the penalty for a binary axiom is lower than all other penalties, because
K2b and a then increase by the same increment. This pattern can be explained as fol-
lows. When a binary axiom has heavy relative weight, this may give too much inﬂuence
to past mistakes. However, when its associated penalty is small relative to the others, it
is good to increase it so as to force the judge to take account of the good decisions that
have been made under the stronger pressure of the other axioms.
Theorem 4. Assume that for every i ∈ D there is a special chain for ϕ beginning at i.T h e





Proof. The structure of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The quantity
K2b2 is the greatest penalty that the judge may incur for a violation of binary axioms.





Step 1. Enumerate the problems in D as 1 2     M. For each problem i,d e ﬁ n et h e
special chain beginning at i as i j2(i)     jn(i)(i). Consider the sequence of problems
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With probability 1, this sequence occurs at a ﬁnite date T.
If ϕ(jn(1)(1)) is not chosen, the penalty is at least a, since a unary axiom is violated.
If, however, ϕ(jn(1)(1)) ischosen, thisentailsatmost K2 violationsofbinaryaxiomswith



















the judge will choose ϕ(jn(1)(1)). For the same reason, the judge will choose ϕ(jn(t)(t))
for t = 2     M.
Step 2. Consider another element jn(1)−k(1), k = 1     n(1) − 1, in the sequence.
If the judge does not choose ϕ(jn(1)−k(1)), he violates at least one binary axiom with
respect to the previous date, so the penalty is at least aδ. If he does choose ϕ(jn(1)−k(1)),
















the judge chooses ϕ(jn(1)−k(1)). Therefore, ϕ is chosen throughout the sequence.
Step 3. Let the element that occurs after this sequence be i. If the judge does not
choose ϕ(i), he violates all binary axioms with respect to the previous occurrence of i
in the sequence. The penalty is, therefore, K2bδt for some 1 ≤ t ≤ Q =
M
j=2n(j) + 1.
Alternatively, if he chooses ϕ(i), he at most violates K2 binary axioms with respect to all
problems preceding the sequence (from the beginning of the history until Q+1 periods
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Step 4. AssumethatthejudgehaschosentheϕpointforS periodsaftertheendofthe
sequence. Let the element that occurs at S +1 be i. If the judge does not choose ϕ(i),h e
violates K2 binary axioms with respect to the previous occurrence of i in the sequence
and the penalty is, therefore, K2bδt for some S + 1 ≤ t ≤ S + Q. If he chooses ϕ(i),h e















This is equivalent to the condition obtained in Step 3. 
It seems difﬁcult to obtain a converse to Theorem 4 because the counterexamples
constructed in the previous sections rely on the speciﬁcs of the models and solutions
under consideration.
Remark3. Intheprevioussections,weassumed a = b = 1,inwhichcasethepremisein
Theorem 4 becomes r ≥ K2 or, equivalently, δ ≤ 1/(1+K2). This explains why the upper
bound for δ with the egalitarian solution (1
2 for K2 = 1) differs from the bound for the
Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions (1
3 for K2 = 2).
Remark 4. We noticed in Section 2 that the assumption that the violation of a binary
axiom never counts for more than δ, which is less than the penalty for a unary axiom,
appearsrestrictive. Itisdifﬁculttoescapethispattern,though. Themoregeneralsystem
ofpenaltiesconsideredinthissectionallowsforarelativepenaltyforbinaryaxioms,b/a,
that is as large as one wishes. However, the inequality r ≥ K2b/a implies that one always










The inequality K2bδ < a means that all the binary axioms together always have a lower
discounted penalty than any unary axiom. It is intuitive that this must hold if one wants
the judge always to make the right choice in every set jn of a special chain.
6. Foresight
Itisagainstthephilosophyofourapproachtoendowthejudgewithforesight,according
to which he would compute the effect of his present decision on penalties he is likely to
incurinthefuture,becauseourapproachisoneofboundedrationalityandlearning,not
full rationality. In addition, foresight is not an important aspect of the doctrine of real-
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judgments rather than on the constraints their current decisions will impose on future
related cases, so our approach is not far-fetched.
Evenwithforesight, however, theproblemdoesnotbecometrivialifthejudgehasto
live with an arbitrary set of precedents that he inherits upon taking ofﬁce and that will
determine penalties he incurs in the future. It is then possible that historical errors will
continue to inﬂuence his decisions and prevent convergence to the “correct” solution.
In this section, we present an example to show that this can indeed occur when the
judgehasforesight. Weadopttheframeworkof Section 3 (focusingontheNashsolution
intheaxiomaticbargainingmodel)andassumethatthejudgeknowstheprobabilitylaw
that governs the occurrence of successive problems. He discounts the future penalties
with a factor β. Suppose he starts his job at time 0, after an arbitrary sequence of de-
cisions have been made for periods −T     −1. He faces a problem i0 and devises a
conditional strategy
x0 x1(i1) x2(i1 i2)     xt(i1     it)     
When a particular history of problems i1 i2     is realized, he must pay the total dis-
counted penalty

t≥0βtpt,w h e r ept is the penalty paid in t for violations of unary ax-
ioms in t and violations of binary axioms in t with respect to past decisions (with the
discount factor δ). Knowing the probability of occurrence of all possible histories, he
can then compute the expected value of

t≥0βtpt for a given conditional strategy and
select the conditional strategy that minimizes this quantity. When history unfolds, he
has to follow only the conditional strategy. Note that the conditional strategy and the
computation of the expected value of

t≥0βtpt can incorporate the fact that the ob-
served sequence of problems up to t may alter the probability of occurrence of future
problems for t +1 t+2    .
What has been done in the previous sections corresponds to the special case in
which β = 0. The judge then only has to choose xt so as to minimize pt, and it sufﬁces
that he does so sequentially for the actual sequence of problems, ignoring the counter-
factual problems.
Consider for a moment that history does start at period 0, i.e., there is no arbitrary
sequence of precedents. If the domain satisﬁes the chain condition (i.e., a special chain
begins at every member) and the random process is regular, then the only way to avoid
penalties in the future is to follow the solution characterized by the axioms. Whenever
β>0, the judge always follows the solution.
We now show that, in contrast, when an arbitrary sequence of precedents encum-
bers the judge’s decisions, a positive β may not sufﬁce to converge to the solution. Con-
sider the example of Theorem 1. Suppose that the past history consists of T times x (it
does not matter whether i or j was the set). Let j occur at period 0.
Suppose the judge knows that the history that will occur beginning at t = 0 is an inﬁ-
nite sequence of j’s. In a moment, we will calculate the condition under which it would
minimize his total discounted penalty to continue playing x forever and hence never
converge to the Nash solution. Now if this condition holds, it must be the case that not
knowing what the sequence will be except that j has occurred at t = 0, his best strategy308 Fleurbaey and Roemer Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
is to play x forever, because the largest total penalty he can ever incur is when the se-
quence beginning at t = 0 is an inﬁnite sequence of j’s. (He would never pay a penalty
when i occurs in a history under this strategy, but he pays a penalty whenever j occurs.)
Additionally, under this special history, if it is rational for him to stick to playing x,t h e n
it must be the optimal conditional strategy as well.
Let us prove that if the judge thinks that only j will occur from t = 0 on, at period 0
he adopts the strategy to retain x forever. If he retains x, he pays an expected penalty of

















































Toillustrate,oneobtainsalackofconvergencewith,e.g.,δ = 0 8,β = 0 95,andT = 5.
7. Conclusion
An interesting fact is that, in all the results of this paper, we get convergence to the solu-
tion precisely when discounting the future is large. This is somewhat counterintuitive:
one might think that convergence to the solution occurs only for intermediate values of
the discount rate, because even if the past decisions must be easily forgotten when they
are bad, they must also retain some force when they are good. As it turns out, for the
latter concern it is enough if the past is not completely ignored (δ>0). This can be un-
derstood by the fact that when convergence takes place, the good decisions are typically
more recent than the bad decisions. Forgetting the latter is then at least as important as
remembering the former and is obtained with a low δ.
However, the analysis of general systems of penalties in Section 5 shows that it is
indeed bad for convergence if some binary axiom induce too low a penalty relative to
the other axioms. This indeed creates the risk that the recent good decisions are binding
only through this “feeble” axiom and their inﬂuence on the current decision may beTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale 309
overwhelmed by the previous bad decisions that may bind through other axioms. It is in
this mechanism that the intuition that the past must retain some power is vindicated.
The approach proposed in this paper may suggest a ranking of characterization the-
orems. Suppose we have a set T of axiomatic theorems of the type we discuss here and
for each theorem τ ∈ T, we prove that in the benchmark case, almost sure convergence
to the appropriate solution occurs if and only if δ ∈ (0 δτ]. This provides a way to rank
the axiomatic theorems in terms of plausibility: the greater is δτ, the more plausible is
the theorem, in the sense that the dynamic version of the theorem (as developed here)
holds for a larger set of discount factors. Thus, we say that the egalitarian theorem is
more plausible than Nash’s or Kalai and Smorodinsky’s theorem.
To be precise, we are saying that if we observe societies that abide by an egalitarian
constitution and societies that abide by a Nash constitution, and discount factors vary
acrosssocietiesrandomly, thenitismorelikelythatwewillobserveallocationsthatlook
like the egalitarian solution in the egalitarian societies than allocations that look like the
Nash solution in Nash societies, because (0  1
3]⊂(0  1
2].
An issue that we did not explore in this paper is the speed of convergence. Almost
sure convergence is obtained in our results with the help of a particular sequence of
problems, all special chains for all members of the domain in a row, which is a rather
unlikely event. For a domain with n problems, each having a special chain of average
length m, this requires a particular arrangement of nm problems, with n! acceptable
permutations of this arrangement. The expected number of periods needed for one of
t h e s ea r r a n g e m e n t st oo c c u ri sl a r g e .F o rn = 10, m = 2, and assuming a random process
withindependentand identicallydistributed drawsandequiprobableproblems, theex-
pected number of periods is around 7 6×1026.8 Convergence can nevertheless occur in
other cases, for instance, if all special chains occur in a sequence, but without a repeti-
tion of problems (i.e., if a special chain has appeared, its elements do not appear again
in the arrangement; if two or more sets share the end of their special chains but not the
beginning, one chain is followed by the remaining part of the other chain). The length
of the special sequence of problems is then reduced from nm to n. In the above example
with n = 10, m = 2, and assuming that there are four special chains, the expected time of
convergence is reduced to 1 7 × 1017, still a large number but signiﬁcantly less so. The
adaptationofour proofsof almostsureconvergenceto thisshorter sequenceis straight-
forward. This, however, provides only a very rough upper bound of the expected time
of convergence. We leave this issue for future research. A related issue, also left for fu-
ture research, is the computation of the probability of convergence, which may be high
without being equal to 1 when δ is greater than the threshold identiﬁed here.
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